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RECENT CASES
Deportability of Criminal Aliens Under
Domestic Equivalent Statute Existing at
"Time of Entry"
Squires v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
689 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1982)
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ordered
the immediate deportation of Herbert Clyde Squires, a citizen of
Canada, because Squires had a previous Canadian conviction for
"false pretences."' The immigration judge ruled that the offense
for which Squires was convicted constituted a "crime involving
moral turpitude" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9),2 and
that Squires was thus an "excludable alien" for purposes of the
deportation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a).8 Squires appealed to the
Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board upheld the immigration
judge's findings with respect to deportability, but allowed Squires
the privilege of "voluntary departure."4 Subsequently, Squires ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals.8 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, held, affirmed: (1) In determining
whether Squires's foreign criminal conviction rendered him deport-
able, the foreign conviction must be analogized to the domestic
equivalent offense as it existed at the time of his entry; and (2)
Since the domestic equivalent offense was a felony at the time of
Squires's entry into the United States, Squires is an excludable
alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), and he is subject to deportation
1. CAN. CR|M. CODE § 304(I)(a) (current version at CAN. CRIM. CODE § 320(1)(a) (1970)).
2. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, [hereinafter cited as INA], § 212(a)(9),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1970).
3. INA, § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970).
4. INA, § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982) provides that:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation
proceedings * * * to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own ex-
pense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral character for
at least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure
under this subsection.
5. The court's jurisdiction is based on 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982).
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under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). Squires v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, 689 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1982).
On or about June 14, 1979, Squires entered the United States
as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. On June 30, 1979, INS be-
gan deportation proceedings. Squires had been convicted in a Ca-
nadian provincial court on August 11, 1970, of the crime of "false
pretences."" The charges stemmed from Squires passing a bad
check in 1969 with knowledge that there were insufficient funds to
cover it.
The court of appeals examined the sections of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act of 1952 which subjected Squires to de-
portation.7 The court recognized the statutory exemption set forth
in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9). Under this section, aliens who have previ-
ously been convicted of a "crime involving moral turpitude" are
ordinarily deportable, except that:
• . . Any alien who would be excludable because of the convic-
tion of a misdemeanor classifiable as a petty offense under the
provisions of section 1(3) of Title 18 [U.S.C.], by reason of the
punishment actually imposed, . . . may be granted a visa and
admitted to the United States.'
The court identified two distinct requirements of this statutory ex-
emption: (1) the crime must be a misdemeanor,o and (2) the crime
must have been "petty" in terms of the punishment imposed. 0
Since Squires committed a petty offense "by reason of the punish-
ment imposed,"" his deportability depended on whether the Cana-
dian crime of "false pretences" was characterized as a felony or a
misdemeanor.1 2
6. Section 304(1)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides in part that:
(1) Everyone commits an offense who (a) by false pretence ... obtains anything
in respect of which the offense of theft may be committed or causes it to be
delivered to another person ....
7. 689 F.2d at 1278.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1(2) (1970) defines a misdemeanor as any offense which is punishable by
one year or less in prison.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970) defines a petty offense as any misdemeanor, "the penalty of
which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than
$500."
* 11. Squires was sentenced in Canada to only six months in prison, and all six months
were suspended. Therefore, his crime is clearly a "petty offense" within the definition of 18
U.S.C. § 1(3). 689 F.2d at 1278.
12. Id. Because the statute under which Squires was convicted, section 304(1)(a) of the
Canadian Criminal Code, carries with it a maximum punishment of ten years imprisonment
[Vol. 15:1
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In making this determination, it is a well-established principle
that the maximum penalty available under a foreign criminal code
is not necessarily dispositive of the crime's characterization for
purposes of United States immigration laws.' 3 To avoid the incon-
sistencies which would arise by virtue of varying penalties for simi-
lar crimes in different nations, the courts look not to the maximum
penalty prescribed by foreign law, but rather to the maximum pen-
alty for an analogous statutory offense under the laws of the
United States." If an equivalent crime cannot be found in title 18
of the United States Code, the reviewing authority must turn to
the provisions of title 22 of the District of Columbia Code. 6
The sixth circuit made an initial inquiry to determine the ap-
propriate statutory analog for the Canadian "false pretences" stat-
ute. Two possible D.C. Code statutes were considered because no
federal offense corresponded directly to Squires's crime. Section
1301 of the D.C. Code' 6 describes the crime of "false pretenses" as
a felony. Using this statute as a domestic equivalent would result
in Squires's deportation. 17 The D.C. Code also contains a "bad
check" statute.'6 At the time of Squires's conviction in Canada,
this statute characterized a "bad check" offense as a misdemeanor.
Two months after Squires's conviction, the "bad check" offense
was reclassified as a felony."s Thus, if the "bad check" statute in
its original form was chosen as the domestic equivalent of Squires's
offense, he would have qualified for the § 1182(a)(9) exemption
and be non-excludable. 0
The court looked beyond the facial similarities between the
Canadian "false pretences" statute and the D.C. Code "false pre-
tenses" statute because of the "extreme importance of the interest
where the amount involved exceeds fifty dollars, the crime appears to be a felony under the
statutory definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1(1). Section 1(1) defines a felony as "any of-
fense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ...."
13. See Patel v. INS, 542 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976); Soetarto v. INS, 516 F.2d 778 (7th
Cir. 1975); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962).
14. 689 F.2d at 1278-79 (citing Patel v. INS, 542 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976); Soetarto v.
INS, 516 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1975); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962)).
15. 689 F.2d at 1279 (citing Soetarto, 516 F.2d at 780-81; Giammario, 311 F.2d at 287).
16. 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1301 (1981).
17. Both the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals chose section
1301 as the proper equivalent offense. Their reasons for doing so were not set forth, but it
appears that they relied simply upon the nominal likeness between section 1301 and the
provision under which Squires was actually convicted. 689 F.2d at 1280.
18. 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1410 (1981).
19. Title 22, section 1410 was amended on October 22, 1970.
20. 689 F.2d at 1279-80.
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at stake."'" After assessing the harsh consequences of deportation,
the court set forth a "fairness" test for determining whether a for-
eign crime constitutes a misdemeanor for purposes of § 1182(a)(9).
The test provides that "a domestic criminal statute is suitable as
an equivalent offense under § 1182(a)(9) only if, under all the cir-
cumstances, both factual and legislative, it would be fair to hold
the alien accountable for a violation thereunder."2 Using this
enunciated test, the court found that it would be unfair to view
Squires's offense under the D.C. Code "false pretenses" statute.
2 3
The court concluded that § 1410, the "bad check" statute, is more
"closely tailored to the particulars" of the crime committed.1
4
After determining the appropriate analog, the court had to as-
certain which version of the "bad check" statute to apply. If the
original classification of § 1410 applied, Squires would qualify for
the § 1182(a)(9) exemption. If, on the other hand, the present ver-
sion of § 1410 was utilized, Squires would be precluded from the
statutory exemption.
Squires urged the court to adopt the "time of conviction"2 5
rule which would allow him to qualify for the petty offense excep-
tion and thus avoid deportation. INS, however, advocated a "time
of entry" rule which would require the prior conviction to be anal-
ogized to a domestic equivalent offense as it existed at the time of
entry into the United States. Neither of these proposed rules is
specifically mandated by statute, regulation or case law. Therefore,
in order to resolve the issue, the court resorted to general princi-
ples of statutory construction, as well as to the underlying policies
reflected by the language, structure, and legislative history of the
statutes involved.26
21. Id. at 1280. The court found support in a principle enumerated in several Supreme
Court decisions which require courts to interpret all aspects of the immigration laws, includ-
ing the § 1182(a)(9) proviso, liberally in favor of the alien. See Woodly v. INS, 385 U.S. 276
(1966); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964); Barber v.
Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954).
22. 689 F.2d at 1280.
23. 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1301.
24. From the facts adduced at the deportation hearing, it appears that Squires's crime
was little more than a routine bad check violation. Squires was charged with the Canadian
crime of "false pretences" because there was no statutory alternative. Had Squires commit-
ted his crime in the District of Columbia, it is likely that he would have been prosecuted
under section 1410. 689 F.2d at 1280-81.
25. This rule would require the foreign conviction to be classified as a misdemeanor so
long as its domestic equivalent was so classified at the time of conviction.
26. 689 F.2d at 1282.
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The court focused on the language of the deportation statute,
". the law existing at the time of. . .entry."2 7 Based upon the
court's review of the legislative history surrounding § 1251, the
court found that Congress intended the "time of entry" language
of § 1251 to apply to changes in criminal statutes as well as
amendments in immigration laws. ' In adopting the "time of en-
try" rule, the court was mindful of the harsh effect such a ruling
has on aliens like Squires who are prejudiced by the amendment of
a domestic criminal statute."
The court concluded that Squires's offense must be analogized
to a violation of the District of Columbia bad check statute, § 1410,
as amended in 1970. Since violation of this statute was a felony at
the time of Squires's entry into the United States, he is an exclud-
able alien and subject to deportation."
This case is significant because it resolves two very important
issues regarding the deportation of aliens previously convicted of
foreign crimes. The opinion sets forth a test to be applied in deter-
mining the appropriate statutory analog for foreign offenses. A do-
mestic criminal statute is a suitable equivalent only if, under all
the circumstances, both factual and legislative, it would be fair to
hold the alien accountable for violation of the domestic offense.
This fairness test is a departure from the traditional cursory view
utilized by the courts in choosing an equivalent domestic offense.
This test will result in a more thorough examination of the legisla-
tive intent of our criminal statutes and the factual circumstances
under which aliens are convicted of foreign offenses. Additionally,
the courts adoption of the "time of entry" rule resolves the diffi-
cult and unsettled classification problem caused by changes in our
criminal statutes.
This ruling, however, will be of little beneficial value to the
alien because it will give retrospective applicability to upgraded
domestic criminal statute. The "time of entry" rule will arbitrarily
determine whether an alien will be excludable based on the precise
27. By referring to "the law existing at the time of ...entry," Congress clearly in-
tended deportability to turn on contemporary federal statutes governing excludable classes,
including section 1182(a)(9). An alien who enters the country subsequent to an amendment
in section 1182(a) or any other excludability provision is thus viewed in light of the new
amendment, even though the act or omission which gives rise to excludability occurred well
before the change in the law. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1285.
30. Id.
1983]
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moment of time in which he enters the country. The critical im-
pact of this ruling is that an alien will not be able to anticipate the
effect his foreign conviction will have on his admission to the
United States.
LINDA SCHWARTZMAN
